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Seventy years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States held that racially 
restrictive covenants, discriminatory 
agreements inserted into deed instruments 
by community developers and white 
homeowners during the first half of the 
20th century, were not enforceable in a 
court of law. Ten years later, the federal 
Fair Housing Act made it illegal to enter 
into such agreements. Nonetheless, 
racially restrictive covenants remain 
visible in deed instruments and continue 
to inflict harm on our society, particularly 
our communities of color. This article 
examines the history and structure of 
racially restrictive covenants in the United 
States in order to better comprehend their 
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the history and structure of racially restrictive covenants in the 
United States to better comprehend their continued existence, despite their illegality. 
While unenforceable, racially restrictive covenants signal tone and intent, may be 
psychologically damaging, and perpetuate segregation. 
Racially restrictive covenants were widespread tools of discrimination used by white 
homeowners to prevent the migration of people of color into their neighborhoods 
during the first half of the 20th century. In its 1948 decision, Shelley v. Kramer, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that racially restrictive covenants could not be enforced, but the 
practice of inserting such covenants into title documents remained common. Finally, in 
1968, the Federal Fair Housing Act made the practice of writing racial covenants into 
deeds illegal.
However, nearly seventy years after Shelley and 60 years after the Fair Housing Act, 
racially restrictive covenants remain common features of deeds. This may be for several 
reasons. First, since covenants run with the land, they become part of the land title in 
perpetuity. Second, the process to remove covenants is expensive and time-consuming. 
Third, the majority of owners may not be aware that their properties are subject to 
racially restrictive covenants. 
Despite these challenges, it may be possible to adopt policies to improve removal rates. 
This paper calls lawyers, urban planners, and real estate professionals to action in light 
of their active role in the proliferation of racially restrictive covenants in the 20th century.
continued existence, despite their illegality. 
This history evidences the active role that 
lawyers, urban planners, and real estate 
professionals play in the proliferation of 
racially restrictive covenants. Our unclean 
hands and the continuing harms inflicted by 
racially restrictive covenants compel actions 
to remedy. 
SECTION I: 
UNDERSTANDING THE 
LEGAL MECHANICS OF 
COVENANTS
Before we can discuss the history and 
ramifications of racially restrictive 
covenants, we must first understand their 
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parties hereto, shall ever be used or 
occupied by, or sold, conveyed, leased, 
rented, or given to, Negroes, or any 
person or persons of the Negro race or 
blood. This covenant shall run with the 
land and bind the respective heirs and 
assigns of the parties hereto for the 
period of twenty-one (21) years from 
and after the date of these presents.8
The basic configurations of racially 
restrictive covenants are demonstrated 
in the companion cases of the landmark 
Shelley v. Kraemer decision. In Shelley, 
the covenant prohibited ownership 
and occupancy by African Americans.9  
In McGhee v. Sipes, the covenant 
prohibited the use and occupancy by non-
Caucasians.10 In Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo 
v. Hodge, the covenants prohibited the sale 
of property to African Americans.11 
Racially restrictive covenants may be 
separated into two broad categories: 
proactive covenants and reactive 
covenants.12 Proactive covenants are 
those that were written and applied by 
developers before new houses were sold, 
often as a condition to Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) securitization and enforced 
by a homeowners’ association.13 For 
example, over the course of three decades, 
the JC Nichols Co. built dozens of racially 
exclusive suburban developments in Kansas 
City, MO, most of which retain their racially 
restrictive covenants.14 Reactive covenants 
are those that were written by informal 
coalitions of neighbors “in response to 
an immediate threat of black movement 
into white middle-class neighborhoods.”15  
These covenants were organized door-to-
door, neighbor-to-neighbor, with the sole 
and explicit purpose of racial exclusion.16  
Brooks and Rose note that reactive 
covenants were more likely to contain flaws, 
basic mechanics. A covenant is defined as 
a binding promise or obligation to do or 
not to do a particular act.1 Covenants may 
be inserted into an instrument of contract 
or other binding agreement; in the case 
of real property, covenants are typically 
contained in a deed.2  If the party promising 
to act in accordance with the agreement 
(the covenantor) fails to fulfill the promise, 
the holder of the promise (the covenantee) 
may sue to enforce the covenant in a court 
of law.3 
Restrictive covenants are a subset of 
covenants that limit and qualify the use of 
real property.4  Restrictive covenants first 
emerged as a means to protect residential 
areas from commercial activity, and they 
continue to be used by homeowners’ 
associations to “protect community 
esthetics.”5  As long as these restrictive 
covenants do not run afoul of Constitutional 
protections, they are permissible.6  This is 
an important distinction from the subject of 
this paper: racially restrictive covenants. 
As with restrictive covenants, racially 
restrictive covenants are agreements 
between buyers and sellers of property 
that limit the covenantor’s property rights, 
usually appearing in the deed instrument. 
Specifically, racially restrictive covenants 
state that the covenantor will not sell, rent, 
or lease property to minority groups.7  
Typical language is illustrated in the case 
of Corrigan v. Buckley, discussed further in 
Section II:
In consideration of the premises and 
the sum of five dollars ($5.00) each 
to the other in hand paid, the parties 
hereto mutually covenant, promise, 
and agree each to the other, and for 
their respective heirs and assigns, that 
no part of the land now owned by the 
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agreed to the violations by failing to seek 
enforcement in the past), abandonment 
(of the general agreement), laches 
(evidence that the covenantee’s undue 
delay in bringing a suit of enforcement 
caused the defendant damages), unclean 
hands (the covenantee also violated 
terms of the covenant), eminent domain 
(the government is not subject to private 
covenants), and change in condition (the 
circumstances have substantially changed 
such that it no longer makes sense to 
enforce the covenant).24  
If, however, our goal is the removal of a 
covenant rather than its enforcement, our 
options are more limited. Termination of a 
covenant typically requires written release 
by the covenantee(s), or the adoption of a 
new covenant that modifies or releases the 
obligations of the original covenant.25 Even 
if a covenant is no longer enforceable, as 
in the case of racially restrictive covenants, 
they will still be visible in the chain of 
title, and even within the language of the 
deed. Brooks and Rose note that “This 
‘sticky’ quality is an artifact of the Anglo-
American conveyancing system, which 
looks to the history of past transactions 
to ascertain the claims against any given 
title.”26 While racially restrictive covenants 
can be eradicated from deed instruments, 
“it’s very time-consuming, and it can get 
very expensive.”27 Nonetheless, as Section 
III discusses, the history outlined in Section 
II places a responsibility on lawyers, urban 
planners, and real estate professionals to 
address the lingering discrimination of 
racially restrictive covenants head-on.
SECTION I I :  A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF RACIALLY 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES
such as failure to obtain signatures from 
spouses, than proactive covenants, which 
rendered them more vulnerable to legal 
challenge.17 
The legal properties of covenants render 
them particularly difficult to remove. 
Covenants are enforceable contracts 
between two or more people that run with 
the land, which present limited means to 
terminate the obligation or defend property 
from enforcement.18 Running with the 
land means that the agreement becomes 
a permanent feature of the property 
title, and that not only the contracting 
parties, but also their heirs and assigns, 
are bound by the agreement. In other 
words, covenants are effective in perpetuity 
unless the terms of the agreement include 
a specific time limit.19 As Olin Browder 
noted in his 1978 analysis, the concept of 
running covenants may be challenging 
for the unindoctrinated: “Why should any 
person be able to enforce a promise not 
made to him or be bound by a promise 
he did not make?”20 Browder posits that 
this legal property stems from the history 
of covenants, which “long anteceded the 
modern elements of contract law; running 
covenants are in essence, therefore, a part 
of the law of property, not an adaptation or 
extension of contract principles to property 
law.”21  
If a covenantor fails to fulfill the terms of 
the promise, the covenantee may sue 
to enforce – or require the covenantor 
to uphold – the covenant in a court of 
law.22 Generally, restrictive covenants are 
enforceable only by the benefitting party, 
although some states allow standing to 
individuals regardless of their ownership 
of neighboring property.23 Defenses to a 
suit for enforcement include acquiescence 
(demonstrating that the covenantee 
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Racially restrictive covenants were 
widespread tools of discrimination during 
the first half of the 20th century.28 Although 
southern states are often identified as 
loci of racial violence and discrimination, 
racially restrictive covenants first appeared 
in California and Massachusetts at the 
end of the 19th century.29 By the time 
the Supreme Court ruled them to be 
unenforceable in 1948, it is estimated 
that more than half of all residential 
properties built in the intervening decades 
were constrained by racially restrictive 
covenants.30 This section offers a brief 
history of racially restrictive covenants in 
the United States to establish the active role 
played by lawyers, urban planners, and real 
estate professionals in the proliferation of 
discriminatory covenants and the continued 
segregation of U.S. cities.
A. The Emergence of  Racial ly 
Restr ict ive Covenants
The first racially restrictive covenants 
emerged in California and Massachusetts 
at the end of the 19th century.31  Early 
racially restrictive covenants were limited 
agreements governing individual parcels.32  
Within a decade, racially restrictive 
covenants had been enthusiastically 
embraced by the real estate industry.33 The 
early 20th century was also marked by the 
rise of sundown towns (in which people 
of color were threatened with sanctioned 
harassment and violence after sunset) and 
the adoption of racial zoning ordinances.34  
Baltimore Mayor Barry Mahool captured 
the tone of the era when he opined 
that “Blacks should be quarantined in 
isolated slums in order to reduce the 
incidents of civil disturbance, to prevent 
the spread of communicable disease into 
the nearby White neighborhoods, and to 
protect property values among the White 
majority.”35
B. Buchanan v. Warley and 
Corrigan v. Buckley
Historians tie the surge in popularity 
of racially restrictive covenants to the 
Supreme Court’s 1917 decision that 
municipally mandated racial zoning was 
unconstitutional.36  In Buchanan v. Warley, 
the Court overturned Louisville’s racial 
zoning ordinance on the grounds that it 
interfered with the core property right of 
alienation (the right to sell or otherwise 
transfer your property).37  While the 
decision was shocking to contemporaries, 
the legal reasoning was consistent with the 
freedom of contract interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that marked turn-
of-the century judicial theory.
As speculative suburban development 
captured the market, community builders 
sought more secure means to protect their 
investment from the “economic threat” of 
racial mixing.38 The Great Migration and the 
1917-1921 racial uprisings may have further 
fueled this perceived threat from African 
American interlopers.39 In this climate, 
racially restrictive covenants offered 
an attractive means of circumventing 
Buchanan.40   
Racially restrictive covenants became even 
more appealing in 1926, when the Supreme 
Court upheld their constitutionality as 
a form of private contract in Corrigan v. 
Buckley.41 In his opinion for the court, 
Justice Sanford stated that:
The constitutional right of a Negro to 
acquire, own, and occupy property 
does not carry with it the constitutional 
power to compel sale and conveyance 
to him of any particular private 
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property. The individual citizen, 
whether he be black or white, may 
refuse to sell or lease his property to 
any particular individual or class of 
individuals. The state alone possesses 
the power to compel a sale or taking 
of private property, and that only for 
the public use. The power of these 
property owners to exclude one 
class of citizens implies the power of 
the other class to exercise the same 
prerogative over property which they 
may own. What is denied one class 
may be denied the other. There is, 
therefore, no discrimination within the 
civil rights clauses of the Constitution. 
Such a covenant is enforceable, not 
only against a member of the excluded 
race, but between the parties to the 
agreement.42
Under Corrigan, racially restrictive 
covenants were defined as a private action 
free of the imprimatur of the State, and 
developers and white homeowners were 
given free rein to construct racially exclusive 
communities through legal agreements.
C. The Rise of  the Modern Real 
Estate Industry
The rise of the modern real estate industry 
in the 20th century was accompanied 
by the “development of brokerage and 
appraisal techniques, and the creation 
of specialized real estate education and 
research facilities” that “institutionalized 
the notion that racial homogeneity is 
a natural characteristic of residential 
neighborhoods.”43  Indeed, in his case 
study of Kansas City, Kevin Scott Gotham 
argues that “Before the rise of the modern 
real estate industry and the creation of 
segregated neighborhoods, there is no 
evidence that residents in Kansas City 
perceived a connection between race, 
culturally specific behavior and place of 
residence.”44 
Local real estate boards and national 
associations of real estate brokers were 
chief orchestrators in the widespread 
adoption of racially restrictive covenants. 
They produced and circulated standard 
restrictive covenants, encouraged the 
formation of homeowners’ associations, 
and stoked fears of racial integration.45  
Associations of real estate professionals 
adopted codes of ethics that characterized 
failure to “protect” white communities 
from integration through creation and 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants 
as unethical.46 Real estate brokers who did 
not comply with these policies could be 
expelled, which would result in the “loss of 
the network of contacts and information 
critical to the practice of the real estate 
broker.”47 On the other hand, brokers who 
engaged in blockbusting (the practice 
of persuading a white owner to sell his 
home to a broker below market value by 
stoking fears of minorities moving into the 
neighborhood, and then making a profit by 
selling the same house to people of color 
at exorbitant rates), in clear violation of the 
code of ethics, enjoyed enormous personal 
gain.48 In sum: real estate professionals 
directly profited from racially restrictive 
covenants, both by their creation and 
strategic deconstruction.
D. New Deal  Era and FHA-
Backed Mortgages
A signature program of the New Deal, 
the FHA sought to stabilize the housing 
market by insuring low-interest, fully 
amortized, twenty-year loans.49  Prior to 
receiving an FHA-backed mortgage, a 
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to recuse themselves because they 
occupied homes with racially restrictive 
covenants, but judicial enforcement as state 
action seemed too broad and potentially 
destabilizing to the legal system to last.58   
Finally, practitioners believed that, even 
without the power of an injunction (court-
ordered enforcement), they could still sue 
for damages for failure to comply with the 
terms of a racially restrictive covenant.59  
The general dismissal of Shelley v. Kramer 
by white institutions may be captured by 
FHA Commissioner Richards’s statement 
that the decision would “in no way affect 
the programs of this agency,” which would 
make “no change in our basic concepts 
or procedures.” Finally, it was not “the 
policy of the Government to require 
private individuals to give up their right to 
dispose of their property as they see fit, as 
a condition of receiving the benefits of the 
National Housing Act.”60 Gotham notes that 
Missouri courts continued to enforce racially 
restrictive covenants for at least five years 
after Shelley.61
F.  Federal  Fair  Housing Act
While Shelley rendered racially restrictive 
covenants unenforceable, the practice of 
writing racially restrictive covenants into 
deed instruments was not illegal until 
1968. The Federal Fair Housing Act made 
it unlawful to refuse to sell, rent to, or 
negotiate with any person because of that 
person’s inclusion in a protected class.62  
However, the Fair Housing Act did not 
prescribe appropriate methods of dealing 
with existing restrictions, a limitation that 
was predicted by some legal scholars long 
before the Fair Housing Act was enacted.63   
This brief history of racially restrictive 
covenants in the United States evidences 
property was required to meet appraisal 
standards, including racial exclusivity.50  
The FHA’s 1935 underwriting manual 
stated, “If a neighborhood is to retain 
stability it is necessary that properties 
shall continue to be occupied by the same 
social and racial classes. A change in social 
or racial occupancy generally leads to 
instability and a reduction in value.”51  This 
language was not removed until 1947 – a 
politically expedient amendment that was 
not accompanied by policy change.52  In 
short, the FHA’s underwriting standards 
advantaged white, deed-restricted, 
greenfield development, leading to the 
proliferation of homeowners’ associations 
and exclusive suburban communities.53  
E. Shelley v. Kramer
In 1948, the Supreme Court revisited and 
overturned Corrigan v. Buckley. Dismissing 
the arguments of both defendants 
(that racially restrictive covenants were 
private agreements not subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment) and plaintiffs 
(“that the freedom to purchase and use 
property, regardless of race or color, was 
a fundamental and basic freedom that 
was protected by the Constitution”54) in 
Shelley v. Kramer and its companion cases, 
the Court held that judicial enforcement 
of racially restrictive covenants constituted 
discriminatory governmental action 
in violation of the Constitution.55 The 
Court concluded that “the state may not 
accomplish indirectly through the courts 
what it cannot constitutionally do directly 
through the legislature.”56 
Notwithstanding this landmark decision, 
racially restrictive covenants continued to 
proliferate. Brooks and Rose posit that this 
was due to Shelley’s perceived fragility.57  
Not only were three of the justices forced 
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of racial discrimination places space at the 
center of the legal conversation.68 Boddie’s 
key thesis is that the law is overly concerned 
with the “racial dynamic between 
individuals,”69  when “a primary vehicle for 
racial discrimination against people of color 
historically has been exclusion from white 
space.”70  Boddie argues that:
The ability to choose space and to 
move unimpeded through and across 
the local spaces of everyday life are 
basic components of freedom, social 
belonging, status, and dignity. Being 
excluded from space or marginalized 
within a particular space is stigmatizing 
and degrading. Racial territoriality 
demeans the individual by prohibiting 
the full expression of the self because 
those who suffer it experience the 
world as outsiders, barred from full 
participation in society.71
“Racial territoriality occurs,” Boddie tells 
us, “when the state excludes people of 
color from – or marginalizes them within 
– radicalized white spaces that have a 
racially exclusive history, practice, and/
or reputation.”72  The territorialization of 
space occurs in two stages. First, spaces 
are classified by and imprinted with social 
significance to certain groups.73  Second, 
spaces are defended by:
“Creating, maintaining, or highlighting 
boundaries;” and then seeking to 
control “access to the area and to 
things within it, or to things outside 
of it be restraining those within.” 
Boundaries may be maintained by 
“signalling [sic] use or ownership 
through signs, markers, and label; or 
communicating warning of varying 
levels of indirectness and subtlety to 
potential intruders…” However, the 
the active role played by lawyers, urban 
planners, and real estate professionals 
in the proliferation of discriminatory 
covenants and the continued segregation 
of U.S. cities. The next section describes 
the ongoing injuries caused by racially 
restrictive covenants, demonstrating that 
their harm did not end with Shelley and the 
Fair Housing Act.
SECTION I I I :  RACIALLY 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
ARE HARMFUL
Most legal scholars would end here: 
Shelley v. Kramer rendered racially 
restrictive covenants unenforceable, and 
the Fair Housing Act made them illegal. 
While both statements are true, they 
ignore the harm that racially restrictive 
covenants continue to inflict on our society, 
particularly within our communities of 
color. Racially restrictive covenants directly 
contributed to segregation, and our country 
remains deeply segregated.64 This harm 
is further compounded in our segregated 
educational system, which reinforces racial 
hierarchies and systems of power.65 And 
“[a]lthough unenforceable, the language 
[of racially restrictive covenants] can be 
psychologically damaging, reinforcing 
old fears and sending a message that 
racism is alive and well in America.”66 As 
demonstrated in the historical analysis 
above, lawyers, urban planners, and real 
estate professionals have unclean hands; 
we cannot now stand still and watch 
as systems of oppression continue to 
propagate. 
To further understand the harm 
perpetuated by racially restrictive 
covenants, this paper will employ the 
framework of racial territoriality proposed 
by Elise C. Boddie.67 Her conceptualization 
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point of territoriality is not so much 
the defense of the area itself but 
controlling the people in the area and 
their interactions. Space, in this sense, 
reflects social power — since only those 
with power can co-opt space for the 
purposes of territorial behavior — but it 
also helps reinforce social hierarchies.74
In short, racial territoriality is a product of 
proprietary power. Cheryl I. Harris takes 
this a step further in her seminal analysis 
of whiteness as property; not only are race 
and property historically entwined, they are 
inseparable.75  
The law – the creation of rules restricting 
behavior and allocating property rights 
in society – is “integral to maintaining this 
spatial system.”76 In the United States, “[t]
he power of the state has been deployed 
to ‘protect’ white space and to ‘contain’ 
nonwhite space, while regulating the 
movement of people of color within and 
across various racial borders in service of 
these objectives.”77 Boddie recognizes that 
the legal system’s failure to account for the 
racial meaning of space may be connected 
to a (subconscious) unwillingness to 
remedy harms inflicted on people of color 
in any way that might adversely impact 
“innocent whites.” 78 Nonetheless, this 
failure limits our capacity to remedy acts of 
racial discrimination that extend beyond 
the observed dynamic between two 
individuals.79 
The framework of racial territoriality 
helps explain why owners of restricted 
property may “feel a kind of ethical 
obligation to abide” by racially restrictive 
covenants despite knowing that they 
are unenforceable.80 It demonstrates 
the implicit power of a covenant, which 
may signal “the nature of the underlying 
covenants to observers, such as prospective 
buyers,” through homogeneity.81 Seen 
through the lens of racial territoriality, 
the reluctance of people of color to live 
in a neighborhood scarred by restrictive 
covenants should not be a surprise.82   
Finally, the racial territoriality framework 
offers justice in a legal system that has 
become too bloated with the minutiae of 
precedent to account for the spatialization 
of white power. 
NEXT STEPS
The time to act is now, but how do we act? 
In his 1963 “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that “In any 
nonviolent campaign there are four basic 
steps: collection of the facts to determine 
whether injustices exist; negotiation; 
self purification; and direct action.” This 
paper has collected the facts and has 
demonstrated that injustices have been 
committed, and worse, have been allowed 
to continue. To rectify these injustices, 
lawyers, urban planners, and real estate 
professionals must engage in dialogue, 
recognize our role in the perpetuation 
of these injustices, and take direct action 
against them. Urban planners, with their 
experience in community engagement and 
commitment to faithfully serve the public 
interest,83  are especially well-situated to 
bring awareness to this issue.
Nearly seventy years after Shelley and 
sixty years after the enactment of the Fair 
Housing Act, racially restrictive covenants 
are still common features of deed 
instruments.84  Why? First, the majority 
of owners may not be aware that their 
properties are subject to racially restrictive 
covenants: “Homebuyers rarely see the 
original deed and real estate attorneys 
hardly ever point out the race restriction.”85  
Silence, however, does not render racially 
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regarding statues of Confederate generals: 
rather than removing the statues, we may 
consider adding a plaque that educates 
readers on our nation’s history. In light of a 
recent study by the Southern Poverty Law 
Center showing that nearly half of American 
high school students polled believed that 
the southern states seceded from the Union 
to protest taxes on imported goods, a little 
education may be exactly what we need.88 
This paper does not offer a fully formulated 
slate of policy recommendations. It is, 
however, a call to action. In the words 
of Brooks and Rose, “Ultimately the 
persistence of covenants, even in very 
attenuated form, should cause us to 
reflect on the question whether Americans 
really want residential integration, and if 
we do, what we mean by integration.”89  
Lawyers, urban planners, and real estate 
professionals should take this opportunity 
to reflect on our role in the proliferation of a 
segregated society, and ask ourselves what 
our role will be in its remedy. ■
restrictive covenants harmless, as discussed 
in Section III. Lawyers, urban planners, 
and real estate professionals have a 
responsibility to reengage public dialogue 
around the history and ongoing damages 
wrought by racially restrictive covenants.
Second, as noted in Section I of this 
paper, racially restrictive covenants, which 
become part of the land title in perpetuity, 
are extremely difficult and expensive 
to remove.86  Here, again, the answer is 
unsatisfactory. Lawyers had the imagination 
to create racially restrictive covenants; they 
also possess the ingenuity to remove, or 
at least deal directly with, them. Rothstein 
offers one such solution. Rather than 
removing racially restrictive covenants, 
he recommends modifying the deed 
instrument by adding a clause disavowing 
the covenant:
We, [your name], owners of 
the property at [your address], 
acknowledge that this deed includes 
an unenforceable, unlawful, and 
morally repugnant clause excluding 
African Americans from this 
neighborhood. We repudiate this 
clause and are ashamed for our 
country that many once considered 
it acceptable, and state that we 
welcome with enthusiasm and without 
reservation neighbors of all races and 
ethnicities.
While Rothstein’s suggestion is not one 
of removal, it has the benefit of being 
currently actionable under our legal system. 
Further, he argues that removal may not 
be the best course of action, as racially 
restrictive covenants are an “important 
reminder and educational device, which we 
still need.”87 This suggestion is analogous 
to one solution in the current debate 
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